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consequence of the want of water than the destruction by fire of a house
which a proper supply of water would have saved? It is the immediate
consequence of the proximate cause." 2
Upon its zone of duty argument, the court seems to be on stronger
grounds. While plausible arguments might be made either way on this
point, it is believed that most courts would support the view taken by
the court, that the plaintiff was not within the class protected by the
statute. S.L.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The plaintiffs drove to the defendant's gasoline station to have their
car lubricated. The defendant was then engaged in blending gasoline
of different grades of volatility. The vapors arising from the gasoline
exploded and caused injury to the plaintiffs. In action of negligence it
was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was applicable.'
The phrase literally translated means, "the thing speaks for itself."
The classic legal definition was given by Erle J. in Scott v. London
Docks Go. as follows: "When the thing is shown to be under the man-
agement of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."'
The doctrine has probably been most frequently invoked in carrier
cases. It has been applied where the plaintiff was injured as a result
of a collision of two trains of the defendant,' and also where plaintiff's
injury was due to the collision of defendant's train with that of another
carrier.' Derailment cases have been a frequent subject for its applica-
tion.' Likewise the plaintiff was permitted to rely upon it in the upset-
ting of a stagecoach.' The court applied it to the case in which the
plaintiff, while waiting on the defendant's car, was struck on the
head by the falling of the trolley pole from the top of the electric car.'
' Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., Law Rep. 6 Exch. 404.
(1871).
ZHiell v. The Golco Oil Co., 137 Ohio St. iSo, z8 N.E. (2d) 56!, 27 Ohio Op.
544, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 429 (1940).
23 H. & C. 596, Exchequer court (z865).
'The Iron Railroad Co. v. John Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418, 38 Am. Rep. 597 (881).4 Toledo Consolidated Street Railway Co. v. Fuller et al., 17 Ohio C. C. 562, 9 Ohio
C. D. 123 (1894).
'Lake Shore Electric Railway Co. v. Hobart, 32 Ohio C. C. 254, 13 Ohio C. C.
N. S. 592 (19o9).
'McKinney v. Neil, i Ohio Fed. Dec. 703, 2 McLean 540 (1839).
'Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio St. 379, 78 N.E. 529, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 98o (i9o6).
NOTES AND COMMENTS I01
The Railroad Co. v. TValrath' case held that the doctrine was applicable
to the falling of a sleeping berth. A Pennsylvania court applied it to a
situation in which the passenger was injured by being thrown against
the seat in front of him when the car came to a sudden stop.
There has been some suggestion that the doctrine of res ipsa should
only be invoked where the relation of carrier and passenger exists but
it is believed that such an arbitrary limitation would be generally rejected
today. No such limitation is imposed in Ohio. In the Cincinnati
Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp case,"0 the court declared that it was the
nature of the act rather than the relation between the parties which
determined whether the doctrine was to be applied. This distinction
is supported by numerous cases. Thus the plaintiff successfully relied
on the doctrine when damage was caused by a driverless, loaded truck.'
The doctrine was applied when the defendant's car left the road and
plunged over an embankment and injured the plaintiff.12 It was invoked
when the plaintiff fell into an elevator shaft because of the sudden mov-
ing upward of a semi-automatic elevator.' The doctrine was used
against a store owner when a sign resting on a narrow ledge fell on the
plaintiff.'
On the other hand the court refused to apply it to a misplaced
manhole cover because the defendant municipality did not have the
exclusive control which is necessary." In the case of an explosion in the
cellar of the decedent, the court would not permit the plaintiff to rely
on res ipsa for there was not the control present in the defendant which
would justify its application." Where an intending passenger was
injured by window glass falling from a crowded street car, the court
refused to impose the doctrine for it was as easy to infer that it wah
caused by other means as to infer that it was caused by the defendant's
negligence." A more recent case held that the accident must be of
such a character that there could be no reasonable inference but that
the injury complained of was due to the negligence of the defendant."
38 Ohio St. 461, io Am. Neg. Cases 706 (xi8z).
'Tilton v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 231 Pa. 63, 79 Atl. 877 (i911).
"vCincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio St. 379, 78 N.E. 529, 113 Am.
St. Rep. 98o (I9o6).
' Cleveland Ice Cream Co. v. Call, 28 Ohio App. S21, x6z N.E. Siz (i9z8).
1 "Weller, Exrx. v. Worstall, i29 Ohio St. 596, 196 N.E. 637, 3 Ohio Op. iz (1935).
"3 Class v. Y.W.C.A., 47 Ohio App. izS, 191 N.E. ioz, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 61o (1934).
"lBenjamin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 6z Ohio App. 83, 23 N.E. (2d) 447, x5 Ohio
OPS. 44Z (1939).
'Cleveland v. Amato, 123 Ohio St. 575, 176 N.E. ZZ7 (193).
"St. Marys Gas. Co. v. Brodbeck, Admr., zix4 Ohio St. 4z3, IS N.E. 323 (1926).
'Cleveland R. Co. v. Sutherland, xiz Ohio St. z62, '5z N.E. 726 (1926).
'-Kovacs v. 0. M. McKelvey Co., 24 Ohio L. Abs. 6zS (937).
It has also been suggested that the doctrine does not apply when there
is direct evidence as to the cause of the accident."
While courts in other states have frequently permitted plaintiffs to
establish a cause of action in certain types of explosion cases by a reliance
upon the res ipsa doctrine,"M there had previously been little support for
such reliance in Ohio. It may be that the effect of the principal case will
be to extend the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Ohio to this
type of case. R.L.R.
SALES-TORTS-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR SALE OF
UNFIT FOOD
Plaintiff's intestate purchased a can of corned beef from his neigh-
borhood grocer and ate a part of it for his supper. By midnight he
was seriously ill, and he died the following morning. The coroner's
certificate stated that an autopsy revealed that death was the result
of ptomaine poisoning caused by eating canned meat. The can of meat
was packed by a South American company, but was distributed by the
defendant under its own name. The court held that violation of a penal
statute covering the sale of unwholesome provisions was negligence
per se, that the statute set up an absolute standard, and it was no defense
that the defendant exercised a high degree of care and was free from
negligence. Plaintiff had only to prove that the meat was sold under
the defendant's name and that the death was caused because the meat
in the can was unfit.'
The problem of who shall be liable for the sale of unfit food has
long been before the courts. They have experienced no difficulty in
holding the retailer liable. Since the thirteenth century it has been
recognized that one who sells food for human consumption is liable in
tort for any injury caused by unfitness of the food sold.' The develop-
ment of the doctrine that one who sells food impliedly warrants to the
purchaser that the food sold is wholesome gave to the claimant a choice
of remedies.' He could sue either in tort for the negligence of the seller
or in contract for the breach of the implied warranty. Public policy
was behind the formation of these rules since the ordinary consumer
"See Cleveland R. Co. v. Sutherland, iS5 Ohio St. z62, z64, 152 N.E. 726, 727
(3926).
'OFor discussion of cases on this point see, z5 C. J. 2o, See. 38. Also see notes
in 8 A.L.R. 500, 23 A.L.R. 484, 39 L.R. ioo6 and 56 A.L.R. 593.
'Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 11o F. (zd) 970, (3940). This case was decided in
a Federal District Court in New York, but the Ohio law was the basis for the decision.
a Si Hen. III Stat. 6, (iz66); Burnby v. Bollett, 16 M.&,V. 644, (1847).
' Sinclair v. Hathaway, 57 Mich. 6o, 23 N.W. 459 (1885); Fairbank Canning Co. v.
Metzger, ix8 N.Y. 26o, 23 N.E. 372, 16 Am. St. Rep. 753 (x89o); Van Bracklin v.
Fonda, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 468 (O8SI)i 3 BL. COMM. 165.
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